Article V — Amending the Constitution

ArtV.1 Overview of Article V, Amending the Constitution

Article V sets forth procedures for amending the Constitution.¹ Most of the Article’s text addresses the proposal and ratification of amendments.² Two sentences at the end of the Article make certain subjects unamendable.³ Since the Founding, Congress has used Article V’s procedures to propose thirty-three constitutional amendments.⁴ The states have ratified twenty-seven of these proposed amendments, which include the first ten amendments, known as the Bill of Rights,⁵ thereby making them part of the Constitution.

Article V establishes two methods for proposing amendments to the Constitution.⁶ The first method requires both the House and Senate to propose a constitutional amendment by a vote of two-thirds of the Members present.⁷ This is the only method for proposing amendments that has been used thus far. Alternatively, Article V provides that Congress “shall” call a convention for proposing amendments upon the request of two-thirds of the state legislatures.⁸ This method of proposing amendments, which scholars have debated at length, has never been used.⁹

Article V also sets forth two methods for states to ratify amendments to the Constitution.¹⁰ Congress determines which method the states must follow in order for proposed amendments to become effective.¹¹ The first method of ratification requires three-fourths of the state legislatures to ratify an amendment to the Constitution.¹² Alternatively, Congress may require that three-fourths of state ratifying conventions approve a proposed amendment.¹³ Congress has specified this second mode of amendment only once, for the Twenty-First Amendment, which repealed the Eighteenth Amendment establishing Prohibition.¹⁴

The last two sentences of Article V make certain subjects unamendable.¹⁵ The first of these sentences prohibited amendments prior to 1808 that would have affected the Constitution’s limitations on Congress’s power to (1) restrict the slave trade, or (2) levy certain taxes on land or slaves.¹⁶ This sentence’s limitations on amendments have expired. The second sentence of Article V, which remains in effect, prohibits amendments that would deprive states, without their consent, from having equal suffrage in the Senate.¹⁷ Scholars have debated whether the last two sentences of Article V effectively prohibit (or formerly prohibited) amendments on these subjects.¹⁸

This essay examines Article V’s procedures for amending the Constitution. It begins with an overview of the historical background of Article V. The Essay then examines relevant Supreme Court decisions, historical practices, and academic debates related to the methods that Article V establishes for proposing and ratifying constitutional amendments.

ArtV.2 Historical Background on Amending the Constitution

Prior to the Founding, the people of the United States experienced difficulties in attempting to amend the Nation’s first charter, the Articles of Confederation.¹ Under the Articles, Congress and all of the states had to approve amendments before they would become effective.² Perhaps unsurprisingly, attempts to amend the Articles to address perceived shortcomings, such as Congress’s lack of authority to raise revenues by levying import duties, were unsuccessful.³ Nonetheless, several state constitutions in existence at the time of the Founding provided for amendments.⁴ Moreover, at least one state, Vermont, successfully modified its charter by following the specific amendment procedures in its constitution.⁵ These early provisions for amendments in the Articles and state charters informed the Founder’s deliberations at the Convention.

During early debates over the Federal Constitution, the delegates agreed to consider language that would permit the states to amend the Nation’s charter without Congress’s approval.⁶ Proponents of including specific procedures for amending the Constitution maintained that such a mechanism would provide stability to the new government.⁷ For example, George Mason stated it was “better to provide for [amendments] in an easy, regular and Constitutional way than to trust [alterations] to chance and violence.”⁸ He argued that states should have the power to amend the Constitution without Congress’s approval because the national legislature would inevitably abuse its power and ignore states’ calls for necessary changes.⁹ Other delegates viewed the inclusion of a provision for amending the Constitution as unnecessary or improper.¹⁰

The delegates did not consider the draft Article V language until a month before the end of the Federal Convention.¹¹ At that time, the draft text required Congress to call a convention for proposing amendments to the Constitution upon the request of two-thirds of the states.¹² Some delegates believed that this text made amendments too difficult and advocated for Congress to play a greater role in proposing amendments. For instance, Alexander Hamilton, who noted the difficulties in amending the Articles of Confederation,¹³ suggested that Congress, acting on its own initiative, should have the power to call a convention to propose amendments.¹⁴ In his view, Congress would perceive the need for amendments before the states.¹⁵ Roger Sherman took Hamilton’s proposal a step further, moving that Congress itself be authorized to propose amendments that would become part of the Constitution upon ratification by all of the states.¹⁶ James Wilson moved to modify Sherman’s proposal to require three-fourths of the states for ratification of an amendment.¹⁷ James Madison offered substitute language that permitted two-thirds of both houses of Congress to propose amendments, and required Congress to propose an amendment after two-thirds of the states had applied for one.¹⁸ This language passed unanimously.¹⁹

The delegates also debated whether Article V should prohibit amendments on certain subjects. Some delegates from the southern states, including John Rutledge of South Carolina, opposed allowing amendments to existing provisions of the draft Constitution that already limited Congress’s power to (1) restrict the importation of slaves, or (2) levy taxes on land or slaves.²⁰ Fervent disagreement between northern and southern states over slavery prompted inclusion of these provisions.²¹ To preserve the compromise on the issue of slavery, the delegates added a sentence to the draft of Article V prohibiting amendments on these subjects before 1808.²² At a later meeting of the convention, Roger Sherman and Gouverneur Morris proposed that no state should, without its consent, be deprived of equal suffrage in the Senate.²³ This proposal, which sought to safeguard state sovereignty and the delegates’ delicate compromise on the structure of the national legislature,²⁴ was agreed to without debate and appended to the end of the draft text.²⁵

Finally, as the Convention drew to a close, the delegates agreed to include a means for the states to propose constitutional amendments. George Mason expressed concerns that, as drafted, Article V would permit Congress to block constitutional amendments favored by the states.²⁶ Gouverneur Morris and Elbridge Gerry proposed to remedy this perceived problem by requiring Congress to call a convention of the states for proposing amendments upon the application of two-thirds of the states.²⁷ James Madison did not see the need for this convention mechanism.²⁸ He argued that Congress would be bound to propose amendments legislatively upon the request of two-thirds of the states.²⁹ Nevertheless, Madison did not oppose including a provision allowing for a constitutional convention.³⁰ The motion passed unanimously.³¹

Following the Convention, the debates over ratifying the Constitution briefly touched upon Article V’s procedures for amending the Nation’s charter. Federalists, who generally supported a strong central government, argued that Article V’s high vote thresholds for proposing and ratifying amendments would protect the Constitution from destructive changes, while permitting amendments to address significant shortcomings in the document.³² Anti-Federalists, on the other hand, expressed concerns that Article V would make amending the Constitution too difficult once it was ratified.³³ Consequently, they advocated for “amendments” to certain subjects prior to submitting the Constitution to the states.³⁴ Federalists opposed such amendments as premature.³⁵

After the states ratified the Constitution, debates continued over amendments, including the adoption of a Bill of Rights.³⁶ In his 1789 Inaugural Address, President George Washington alluded to these ongoing debates, stating that the people of the United States would ultimately judge when it was appropriate to exercise “the occasional power delegated by the fifth article of the Constitution.”³⁷

ArtV.3.1 Overview of Proposing Amendments

Article V establishes two methods for proposing amendments to the Constitution.¹ The first method requires both the House and Senate to propose a constitutional amendment by a vote of two-thirds of the Members present.² Since the Founding, Congress has followed this procedure to propose thirty-three constitutional amendments, which were sent to the states for potential ratification.³ The states ratified twenty-seven of these amendments.⁴

Alternatively, Article V provides that Congress “shall” call a convention for proposing amendments upon the request of two-thirds of the states.⁵ This method of proposing amendments has never been used.⁶ Scholars continue to debate issues surrounding these Article V conventions, including: (1) whether Congress must call a convention upon receiving the requisite number of state applications; (2) whether the convention can be limited in any way (the “runaway convention” debate); and (3) Congress’s control over other aspects of a convention (e.g., rules of procedure).⁷

ArtV.3.2 Congressional Proposals of Amendments

The first method for proposing amendments permits two-thirds of the Members of the House and Senate to propose a constitutional amendment when they “shall deem it necessary.”¹ This is the only method that has thus far been used to propose amendments to the Constitution.

The Supreme Court addressed Article V’s procedures for congressionally proposed constitutional amendments in the National Prohibition Cases, which challenged the validity of the Eighteenth Amendment.² In these cases, the Supreme Court held that both the House and Senate must propose a constitutional amendment by a vote of two-thirds of the Members present (rather than two-thirds of the entire membership present and absent), assuming the presence of a quorum.³ The Court also held that Congress’s successful proposal of an amendment indicates that Congress considers the amendment “necessary.”⁴ Thus, it appears that the Court will not require Congress to state that an amendment is necessary specifically or second-guess Congress’s judgment on the issue of necessity.⁵

Although Members of Congress have introduced more than 11,000 proposed amendments to the Constitution since the Founding,⁶ Congress has approved only thirty-three proposed amendments by the requisite two-thirds vote.⁷ Congress has historically proposed constitutional amendments by enacting a joint resolution.⁸ Following historical practice involving proposing amendments, which included the Bill of Rights, Members of Congress have proposed amendments as codicils (i.e., supplementary articles), rather than line-by-line revisions to the Constitution’s text.⁹ After congressional approval, proposed amendments are sent to the states for potential ratification.¹⁰

ArtV.3.3 Proposals of Amendments by Convention

Article V establishes an alternative method for amending the Constitution by a convention of the states.¹ It provides that Congress “shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments” upon the request of two-thirds of the state legislatures.² This method of proposing amendments, which scholars have debated at length, has never been used.³ This essay surveys a few of the most prominent debates surrounding an Article V convention of the states.

One ongoing debate concerns whether Congress must call a convention upon the request of two-thirds of the states. Article V states that Congress “shall call a Convention” when enough states have applied for one. Some of the Constitution’s Framers, concerned that Congress would block amendments favorable to the states,⁴ argued that this language would obligate Congress to call for a convention after receiving the requisite number of state requests.⁵ Furthermore, some of the earliest Members of Congress argued that Congress had no power to deliberate on whether to call an Article V convention once it received the requisite number of applications.⁶

However, more recently, some modern scholars have theorized that Congress may be able to block a convention by exercising its apparent role in reviewing state applications and deciding whether the requisite number of states has applied for a convention.⁷ In addition, Congress might refuse to submit amendments that result from an Article V convention to the states for ratification.⁸ Because it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would order Congress to call a convention or submit a proposed amendment to the states,⁹ such arguments raise questions about whether Article V effectively obligates Congress to call for a convention.

Another ongoing debate revolves around whether a state convention, once called, may be limited to addressing certain topics. Concerns with a so-called “runaway convention” that proposes amendments on subjects beyond the scope of the initial call have prompted many of these debates. Some commentators have argued that states may (or must) determine the scope of an Article V convention by applying for a convention on a specific subject or group of subjects.¹⁰ Congress would then be obliged to call a convention only on the issues in the state applications.¹¹ Other scholars have argued that the text of the Constitution provides only for a general convention, one not limited in scope to considering amendments on a particular matter.¹²

A third prominent debate concerns Congress’s control over other aspects of a convention. During debates over the Constitution, James Madison questioned how an Article V convention would be formed and conduct its proceedings.¹³ In the modern era, scholars have debated various issues, including: (1) how delegates to the convention should be chosen; (2) whether Congress, state legislatures, or the delegates should set rules of procedure for the convention; (3) the vote threshold would be required to propose an amendment in convention; and (4) how voting rights on a proposed amendment should be apportioned among the states.¹⁴ Beginning at least as early as the 1960s, Members of Congress have introduced various pieces of legislation that would seek to establish some procedures for an Article V convention.¹⁵

Since 1960, the states have submitted more than 180 applications for Article V conventions on various subjects.¹⁶ However, Congress has never deemed Article V’s threshold for calling a convention to be met. Many unresolved questions surround the state application process, including how to determine whether state applications address the same subject matter and whether the applications expire after a certain amount of time.¹⁷ In the past several decades, the states have come closest to satisfying the threshold for calling a convention of the states on the issues of apportionment in state legislatures¹⁸ and requiring a balanced federal budget.¹⁹

ArtV.3.4 Role of the President in Proposing an Amendment

The Constitution does not specifically establish a role for the President in amending the Constitution.¹ Nonetheless, some Presidents have played a ministerial role in transmitting Congress’s proposed amendments to the states for potential ratification. For example, President George Washington sent the first twelve proposed amendments, including the ten proposals that later became the Bill of Rights, to the states for ratification after Congress approved them.² In addition, President Abraham Lincoln signed the joint resolution proposing the Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery even though his signature was not necessary for proposal or ratification of the amendment.³

Despite these examples of Presidents playing an informal, ministerial role in the amendment process, the Supreme Court has articulated the Judicial Branch’s understanding that the President has no formal constitutional role in that process. In a brief opinion in the 1798 case Hollingsworth v. Virginia, the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment had been “constitutionally adopted.”⁴ The Supreme Court reporter recorded Justice Samuel Chase’s statement during oral argument that the President “has nothing to do with the proposition, or adoption, of amendments to the Constitution.”⁵

Later, in the 1920 case Hawke v. Smith, the Supreme Court characterized the Court’s decision in Hollingsworth as having “settled” that “submission of a constitutional amendment did not require the action of the President.”⁶ Therefore, the Court appears to have adopted the view that the President cannot veto a proposed amendment.

ArtV.4.1 Overview of Ratification of a Proposed Amendment

Article V sets forth two methods by which states may ratify amendments to the Constitution.¹ Congress determines which of the two methods the states must use in order to ratify a particular proposed amendment.² The first method of ratification requires three-fourths of the state legislatures to ratify an amendment to the Constitution.³ Alternatively, Congress may require that three-fourths of state ratifying conventions approve a proposed amendment.⁴ Congress has specified this second mode of amendment only once, for the Twenty-First Amendment, which repealed the Eighteenth Amendment establishing Prohibition.⁵

ArtV.4.2.1 Congressional Deadlines for Ratification of an Amendment

The first method of ratification requires three-fourths of the state legislatures to ratify a proposed amendment to the Constitution.¹ Although this method has been used to ratify twenty-six of the Constitution’s twenty-seven successful amendments,² many questions concerning this mode of ratification remain unresolved.

One prominent question is whether Congress may place a deadline on the states’ ratification of a proposed amendment, either in the text of the proposed amendment or the accompanying joint resolution. The text of Article V does not specifically address the issue. In Dillon v. Gloss, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution implictly authorizes Congress to “fix a definite period” for ratification of an amendment.³ In that case, the Court upheld Congress’s specification of a seven-year time limit on the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment establishing Prohibition.⁴

The Dillon Court determined that Congress’s specific power to determine the mode of ratification (i.e., by state legislatures or state ratifying conventions) implied an incidental authority to specify a deadline for ratification.⁵ Furthermore, as a practical matter, a definite period for ratification would ensure that states understood how much time they had to ratify the amendment.⁶ Although the Court also opined that, regardless of whether Congress specifies a deadline, the time period for ratification must be “reasonable,” it appears this language was subsequently regarded as nonbinding dicta in Coleman v. Miller.⁷ Beginning with its 1917 proposal of what would become the Eighteenth Amendment, Congress has specified a deadline of seven years for the ratification of every proposed amendment except for the proposal that became the Nineteenth Amendment recognizing women’s suffrage.⁸

Limited historical practice suggests that if Congress does not specify a deadline for ratification, the amendment remains pending before the states until the requisite number of states have ratified it. In 1992, the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, which addressed the effective date of congressional pay raises, became part of the Constitution more than 202 years after it was proposed.⁹ At the time, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) advised that the amendment became part of the Constitution once the Archivist of the United States certified that the requisite number of states had ratified the amendment.¹⁰ Rejecting dicta to the contrary in Dillon, the OLC stated that, in the absence of a congressionally proposed deadline, an amendment remains pending before the states.¹¹

ArtV.4.2.2 Effect of Prior Rejection of an Amendment or Rescission of Ratification

Additional unresolved questions are whether a state may (1) ratify an amendment after rejecting it, or (2) rescind its ratification of a constitutional amendment before that amendment becomes part of the Constitution. The Supreme Court addressed these issues in Coleman v. Miller.¹ In Coleman, twenty-four members of the Kansas state legislature sought a writ of mandamus compelling state officials to recognize that Kansas had not ratified an amendment to the Federal Constitution, the Child Labor Amendment,² challenging the way the vote was taken.³ One of the plaintiffs’ arguments was that the ratification was invalid because the Kansas state legislature previously rejected the amendment.⁴

The Supreme Court indicated that whether a state could ratify an amendment after rejecting it—or rescind an amendment already ratified—were political questions for Congress to resolve.⁵ As support for this theory, the Court cited Congress’s 1868 adoption of a concurrent resolution declaring that the Fourteenth Amendment had been ratified.⁶ Congress adopted this resolution despite the fact that three states had previously rejected the amendment before later ratifying it, and two states attempted to rescind their prior ratifications.⁷

However, it is unclear whether this historical practice remains relevant. The adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment presented special circumstances. The three southern states that previously rejected the Amendment had constituted new governments at Congress’s direction as a result of Reconstruction by the time they ratified it.⁸ Thus, the Court’s ruling would not appear to have definitively resolved questions about the effect of a prior ratification or rejection.⁹ Furthermore, since Coleman, some commentators have expressed doubts that Congress has any constitutional role in determining whether a state has properly ratified a proposed constitutional amendment.¹⁰

ArtV.4.2.3 Authentication of an Amendment’s Ratification

Another prominent debate surrounds the method by which the states’ ratification of an amendment is authenticated. Article V provides that an amendment becomes part of the Constitution “when ratified” by three-fourths of state legislatures or state ratifying conventions.¹ In Dillon v. Gloss, the Supreme Court held that an amendment becomes part of the Constitution on the day that the number of state ratifications meets the three-fourths threshold.² Consequently, the date on which an Executive Branch official proclaims the amendment has been ratified is not controlling.³

Under current federal law, the Archivist of the United States is responsible for certifying that a proposed constitutional amendment has been ratified after receiving “official notice” from three-fourths of the states that they have adopted the amendment in accordance with the Constitution.⁴ The Archivist publishes the amendment’s text along with a certificate listing the states that have adopted the amendment.⁵ The Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel has adopted the view that, in order to perform this duty, the Archivist must determine whether “he has received official notice that an amendment has been adopted according to the provisions of the Constitution.”⁶ The Archivist may consult the Attorney General on this legal question, as he did with respect to the states’ ratification of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment.⁷

ArtV.4.3 Ratification by Conventions

Alternatively, Congress may require that state ratifying conventions approve a proposed amendment.¹ Congress has specified this second mode of amendment only once, for the Twenty-First Amendment, which repealed the Eighteenth Amendment establishing Prohibition.² In the joint resolution proposing the Twenty-First Amendment, Congress specified that “conventions in three-fourths of the several States” must ratify the Amendment for it to become operative.³

At the time Congress proposed the Twenty-First Amendment in 1933, many politicans believed that only state ratifying conventions should ratify constitutional amendments that implicated individual rights and morals.⁴ In addition to seeking a ratification method deemed to better reflect the popular will, Congress may have also wished to bypass the Temperance lobby, which remained powerful in state legislatures.⁵ According to this view, by specifying that specially elected state delegates would ratify the Amendment, rather than state legislators, Congress increased the Amendment’s chances of successful ratification.⁶

Neither the Constitution nor Supreme Court precedent specifically provides guidance as to how the states should convene ratifying conventions, select delegates, or conduct the proceedings. The thirty-eight state conventions that considered the ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment in 1933 followed a variety of procedures.⁷ In general, the delegates at the state conventions, most of whom were pledged to vote for the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, did not engage in significant deliberation on an issue that already received strong popular support at the polls.⁸

ArtV.4.4 Choosing a Mode of Ratification

The Supreme Court has held that Congress determines whether state legislatures or state ratifying conventions should consider the ratification of a proposed constitutional amendment.¹ In United States v. Sprague, the federal government indicted defendants under the National Prohibition Act (NPA) for unlawfully transporting and possessing intoxicating liquors.² The lower courts quashed the indictment, determining that Congress lacked the authority to enact the NPA.³ These courts held that the Eighteenth Amendment, which granted Congress the authority to enact laws like the NPA, was invalid because state legislatures had ratified it rather than state ratifying conventions.⁴

On appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether state conventions should have ratified the Eighteenth Amendment because it conferred new powers on Congress to abridge individual rights by enacting laws to enforce Prohibition.⁵ The Court rejected this argument, determining that “the choice . . . of the mode of ratification lies in the sole discretion of Congress.”⁶

State legislatures have ratified twenty-six of the twenty-seven amendments that have become part of the Constitution.⁷ As noted, Congress has chosen the convention method of ratification only once.⁸ In the joint resolution proposing the Twenty-First Amendment repealing Prohibition, Congress specified that “conventions in three-fourths of the several States” must ratify the Amendment for it to become operative.⁹

ArtV.5 Unamendable Subjects

The last two sentences of Article V made certain subjects unamendable.¹ The first of these sentences prohibited amendments prior to 1808 that would have affected either of two subjects addressed in Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution: (1) limitations on Congress’s power to prohibit or restrict the importation of slaves before 1808; and (2) limitations on Congress’s power to enact an unapportioned direct tax.² As noted, during the convention in Philadelphia, some delegates from the southern states opposed allowing amendments to provisions of the Constitution that limited Congress’s power to restrict or tax the slave trade.³ To mitigate these concerns, the delegates added a sentence prohibiting amendments on these subjects before 1808.⁴ This sentence’s restrictions on amendments have expired.

The second sentence of Article V, which remains in effect, provides “that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.”⁵ This provision was introduced by Roger Sherman, one of the architects of the Connecticut Compromise, out of concern that three-quarters of the States might use Article V to abolish or deprive smaller states of their representation in the Senate.⁶ Writing in the Federalist Papers after the Federal Convention, James Madison suggested that this exception would assuage concerns that large states would use the amendment process to infringe upon the sovereignty of the smaller states by reducing their voting power in the Senate.⁷ He wrote, “The exception in favor of the equality of suffrage in the Senate, was probably meant as a palladium to the residuary sovereignty of the States, implied and secured by that principle of representation in one branch of the legislature; and was probably insisted on by the States particularly attached to that equality.”⁸

By expressly prohibiting amendments that would deprive a state of equal suffrage in the Senate without its consent, Article V enshrines the “partly federal, and partly national” structure of the bicameral Congress, which was at the heart of the Connecticut Compromise.⁹ In vesting the legislative power in a bicameral Congress, the Framers of the Constitution purposefully divided and dispersed legislative power between two Chambers—the House of Representatives with representation based on a state’s population and the Senate with equal state representation.¹⁰ The Framers recognized that the division of legislative power between two distinct Chambers of elected members was needed “to protect liberty” and address the states’ fear of an imbalance of power in Congress.¹¹ As later explained by Chief Justice Warren Burger, “the Great Compromise, under which one House was viewed as representing the people and the other the states, allayed the fears of both the large and small states.”¹² By diffusing legislative power between two Chambers of Congress, including a Senate in which the states had equal suffrage, the Framers of the Constitution also sought to promote the separation of powers, federalism, and individual rights.¹³ They designed the bicameral Congress so that “legislative power would be exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate in separate settings.”¹⁴

Controversial since its inception because it protects small state interests against those of larger states, Article V’s prohibition on amending the Constitution so as to deprive states of equal suffrage has been a subject of scholarly interest. In discussions on whether the Article V prohibition should be given full legal force,¹⁵ some commentators have noted that the Constitution’s text and the Framers’ intent require the provision to have legal effect.¹⁶ Commentators have also argued that the people of the United States have accepted other limitations on the amending power (e.g., the high vote threshold for proposal and ratification of amendments).¹⁷ Thus, in their view, it is unclear why the limitation on depriving states of equal suffrage in the Senate should not also have legal effect.¹⁸

Academic debates over the legal force of Article V’s clause on unamendable subjects echo broader discussions of other possible external, textual, or implicit limitations on the amendment of the Constitution.¹⁹ For example, scholars have debated whether it is possible to amend those provisions of the Nation’s charter that embody fundamental norms or characteristics of the U.S. Government (e.g., provisions that establish a republican form of government).²⁰ Other debates have focused on whether Article V’s procedures for amendment can themselves be amended.²¹ Such debates, many of which have been part of the national conversation since the Founding,²² raise critical questions about how the Nation may alter its fundamental law.